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As expected before the extraordinary 
parliamentary elections, Ukraine has yet 
to obtain the desired degree of political 
stability, first of all because the repre-
sentation of this country’s political forces 
has remained almost unchanged in the 
current Parliament, but with a smaller 
reserve of stability. There was an ade-
quate majority behind the political forces 
in the former coalition, though it was 
diverse in its political ideology. This 
guaranteed a solid majority in Parlia-
ment, even if some deputies were absent. 
This is not the case with the three-vote 
majority for the BYT/NU–NS coalition in 
the new Parliament, which appears in 
many cases to be insufficient. The situa-
tion will call for further compromises of 
kinds that remain far from being evi-
dent, apart from the familiar ideas 
about the need to unite East, West and 
South, and the almost identical social 
commitments of all parties, whose conse-
quences are discussed later in this paper. 
The latter is a crucial issue, economically 
and politically, and calls for separate 
assessment. 
The Ukrainian political establishment 
faces at present three possible scenarios. 
The first is to attempt to find a consoli-
dated course of action, agreed on by 
most of the political heavyweights. This 
will need above all political concessions 
and moderation of the existing social 
commitments, which will otherwise con-
tinue to be made until the presidential 
election is held in 2009. The second is a 
scenario of stalwart opposition, which 
could even lead to another early dissolu-
tion of Parliament, if it proves unable to 
function. The third is an intermediate 
scenario assuming that further early elec-
tions will bring a political catastrophe 
for those whom the voters blame for the 
political instability. So it cannot be ruled 
out that the situation will remain fragile 
after the 2009 presidential election, with 
most major political forces pursuing their 
own partisan interests. There will be 
various negotiations over this or that 
agreement, and the parties will vote ei-
ther according to the situation or on the 
basis of political agreements reached and 
in the context of the 2009 electoral 
campaign. The third scenario seems the 
most likely, which means that the politi-
cal situation will remain unclear in many 
respects for another two years. Stability 
can be expected only after the presiden-
tial election and the associated changes 
in the country’s Parliament, which will 
be free to review the Constitution and 
create new constitutional mechanisms to 
build the foundations for future stability.  
The economic consequences of these 
forecasting processes are rather complex, 
and so are the medium-term prospects 
for Ukraine’s economy. Despite some po-
litical disorder, Ukraine has actually been 
quite successful economically over the 
last four years. Despite a sharp fall in 
the growth rate in 2005 and a marked 
increase in inflation (now exceeding 10 
per cent), the average annual rate of 
growth since 2000 has been around 7.5 
per cent. So the political disturbances 
that led in 2004 to a serious political 
crisis have not made a serious impact on 
economic growth. Ukraine’s economy has 
quietly survived the sugar, petrol, bread, 
and most recently gas crises that ap-
peared periodically against the back-
ground of political unrest. The most se-
rious for the economy was the gas-price 
rise from USD 50 to USD 130 per 1000 
cu. m., which had an obvious political 
dimension as well. But Ukraine’s econ-
omy appears to have been well prepared 
for such changes, although the present 
gas prices are still much lower than 
market prices in a European sense. 
There are grounds for thinking that 
Ukraine may enjoy comparatively stable 
future development, despite some aggra-
vations to be expected in the very near 
future, but there is no excluding the 
possibility that the economy’s stability and 
potential for growth may prove insuffi-
cient to support further high rates of 
growth in the short and medium term.  
Based on these considerations, this pa-
per is built up as follows. First comes 
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discussion of scenarios and medium-term 
forecasts for the development of 
Ukraine’s economy, assuming no acute 
deterioration in the political situation for 
domestic or external reasons. Then 
comes an assessment of possible eco-
nomic developments resulting from major 
reorientation of public expenditure to-
wards welfare purposes, resulting from 
political commitments made by all politi-
cal parties now represented in the 
Ukrainian legislature. There is also dis-
cussion of the possible economic conse-
quences of such a change of course in 
relation to various external factors, 
above all the sharp increase in gas 
prices, as there are certain economic 
and political indications today that such 
a course of events may ensue. These two 
factors, in fact, may greatly destabilize 
the economy, so that it is advisable to 
deal with them separately and highlight 
the possible outcome of them. 
The scenarios derived from the fore-
casts and analyses lead to a definition of 
the basic strategy as one that is invest-
ment-intensive and designed to improve 
the country’s competitiveness, assuming 
there are no serious destabilizing proc-
esses at work.  
In that case, the period 2007–15 may 
mark an important stage in the accelera-
tion of the country’s economic and social 
development, through progressive eco-
nomic restructuring, deeper foreign inte-
gration, and considerable improvements 
in the functioning of market institutions 
and deregulation policy. If that is not 
the case, Ukraine will drift towards a 
pattern of fully dependent economic de-
velopment, with continual aggravation of 
the social contradictions. So the target 
must be to create conditions for efficient, 
rapid economic growth based on invest-
ment and innovation, to ensure struc-
tural and technological modernization of 
the economy and a steady increase in 
the wellbeing of citizens. This target, in 
fact, sets the main line of the state’s 
economic policy. In the basic scenario, it 
is assumed that economic growth will 
increase from late 2007 through to 
2015, at the cost of economic restructur-
ing, innovation investment, growing com-
petition on domestic and foreign mar-
kets, and transformation of the flow 
mechanisms capital and labour, so pro-
moting more efficient use of the factors 
of production. 
External assumptions 
It is assumed that new tendencies in the 
world economy will put mounting pres-
sure on the developed countries, causing 
increasing international competition. There 
will be a comparatively slow increase in 
gas-import prices, but oil prices will con-
tinue to increase in 2007–15, which 
could bring a considerable loss of com-
petitive advantage for this country’s en-
ergy-intensive economy, along with a fall 
in exports and hence GDP growth rates 
and a simultaneous increase in domestic 
prices. The negotiations for Ukraine to 
accede to the WTO will be completed. 
The market for Ukraine’s exports will 
ease, which could restrict the growth 
potential of the economy and reduce 
hard-currency earnings by exporters. 
There will be a gradual shift from an 
export-oriented economic pattern to one 
of modernization and expansion of the 
domestic market. 
Domestic assumptions 
The real sector (2007–15) 
 
For the 2007–9 period, the following 
predictions are made: 
∗ The new government and the corpo-
rate sector will aim towards an inno-
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vation and investment-based model 
that will lead to increased demand for 
scientific and technological, educational 
and investment services. There will be 
a moderate increase in the energy 
component of expenditure in the ser-
vice sector, especially transport. There 
will be trade-offs between higher 
prices for public utilities, the ability of 
households to pay these, and the prof-
itability of producers and investors. 
∗ Investment spending will move to-
wards medium-term budget funding 
and priority realization of budget-
funded programmes. Such expendi-
tures will be directed primarily to en-
ergy saving and efficient use of en-
ergy resources (bringing in the longer 
term some reduction in the country’s 
energy dependence), and realization of 
government innovation initiatives. 
∗ Ukraine’s attainment of market-
economy status in the EU and the 
United States would create conditions 
for reducing exporters’ losses from 
anti-dumping restrictions (in particu-
lar, through revision of anti-dumping 
duties on imports of Ukrainian goods). 
These developments would support 
foreign trade activities in 2008–15. 
∗ The inflation rate in 2007–8 is fore-
cast to be 12–14 per cent (from De-
cember to December). This will be 
due to higher energy prices, which 
will not lead to crisis thanks to grad-
ual adaptation by firms to the new 
realities, but it will reduce their prof-
itability and dampen the growth of 
energy-intensive activities, above all 
chemicals, metallurgy, and adjacent 
sectors that consume the output of 
these. At the same time, a higher in-
flation rate will result from excessive 
welfare expenditures in 2004–7, along 
with uncontrolled expenses on elec-
toral campaigns, large increases in 
borrowing, especially by corporations 
and banks, and increasing transfers 
home by workers abroad, all of which 
will speed up growth in the money 
supply. Pessimistic forecasts put the 
inflation rate at over 15 per cent by 
late 2008, due to such factors as in-
creases in production costs in 2007 
(relating to the increase in energy 
prices in 2006 and increased payroll 
costs), further rises in food prices, no-
tably because of the poor harvest in 
2007, higher rail fares and public-
utility rates, and corresponding multi-
plier effects. 
The main prediction for 2010–15 is 
an increase in investment, as the decisive 
factor behind economic growth, and 
support for stable output dynamics. This 
will be conditioned by the following de-
velopments: 
∗ Ukrainian producers will need to in-
novate and ensure a vigorous revival 
of their fixed capital, due to more se-
vere domestic competition after WTO 
accession and stronger orientation to-
wards EU accession, against a back-
ground of reviving integration proc-
esses in the post-Soviet area. 
∗ There will be an introduction of en-
ergy-saving technologies (above all in 
the energy-intensive sectors of metal-
lurgy, chemicals, heavy machinery and 
construction) and stronger moderniza-
tion in the infrastructure sectors. 
∗ There will be an expansion of mort-
gage credit to support housing con-
struction on a large scale.  
∗ There will be a stronger inflow of 
FDI, mainly due to the expanding 
domestic market. This increase is ex-
pected to be USD 6500 million in 
2009. There will also be an increase 
in “long” resources on financial mar-
kets, with the expansion of household 
savings and non-governmental pension 
funds. 
Meanwhile the development of invest-
ment activity will be curbed by compara-
tively high inflation, bringing higher in-
terest rates on financial markets and 
appreciation of foreign resources for 
non-government borrowing. The forecast 
for 2010–11 will be an investment 
growth rate of 10.2–12.1 per cent, slow-
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ing to an annual 7.5–9.3 per cent in 
2012–15. 
GDP growth (projected at an annual 
6.8 per cent in 2009–11, increasing to 
7.2 per cent in 2012–15) will be im-
proved by a greater Ukrainian presence 
on foreign markets and an increase in 
the capacity of the domestic market, with 
simultaneous restrictions of exports of 
finished goods. The basis for such a 
growth will be structural changes pro-
ducing a considerable increase in the 
production of goods with a high value 
added, along with faster development of 
certain service sub-sectors, such as busi-
ness, computer, scientific and engineering 
services.  
As real development rates rise, infla-
tion will ease – at the expense of tech-
nological progress, which will cheapen 
production costs (in particular, the en-
ergy component of them), and through 
saturation of the domestic market with 
domestic goods, provided there is consis-
tent inflation targeting.  
During the forecast period, some 
Ukrainian workers presently employed 
abroad will return to the domestic la-
bour market. This trend will be sup-
ported by higher rates of economic 
growth, higher incomes inside the coun-
try, and economic restructuring that 
raises demand for highly qualified work-
ers. On the other hand, low birth rates 
will tend to aggravate the general short-
age of labour, leading to an influx of 
foreign workers. (These in the main will 
be workers from the third world willing 
to work for lower rates of pay than 
those found in Western countries.) This 
means there will be a considerable 
change in the balance of labour flows 
and a decrease (after 2010) in the over-
all positive balance of money transfers.  
In the basic variant for the develop-
ment of the services sector in 2008–15, 
the assumptions are these:  
So long as the government and busi-
nesses follow a course towards innova-
tion and investment-based development, 
to promote an increase in demand for 
scientific and technological, educational 
and investment services, the expected in-
crease in R & D expenditures will be 3 
per cent of GDP by 2010 and 3.5–4.0 
per cent by 2013. (The latter was Swe-
den’s level in 2004.) Simultaneously, 
there will be an increase in earned roy-
alties and licence payments. Ukraine in 
2004 earned USD 0.9 in per capita roy-
alties and licence payments. (The figures 
were USD 1.5 for Russia, USD 54.2 for 
Ireland, USD 0.384 for Sweden, and 
USD 178.2 for the United States.) 
There will be improved welfare stan-
dards, or at least no decrease in the 
share of expenditures (percentage of 
GDP) on education, health care and de-
fence, relative to 2005–6.  
There will be some fall in the GDP 
share of the services sector in 2008–9, 
due to the following factors: 
∗ Renewed growth rates in other sec-
tors. 
∗ A decrease in the relatively high ser-
vice efficiency, due to renewal of ma-
terial support of non-market services. 
∗ A decrease in the role of transport 
services, whose expansion would re-
quire considerable investment, time 
and agreements with other countries. 
In the basic scenario, the share of 
services in GDP in 2015 may be 59–60 
per cent (discounting construction ser-
vices). In the optimistic scenario, it will 
be 61–3 per cent. 
Monetary policy in 2007–15 will be 
determined by the following: 
∗ The National Bank will follow a re-
served (flexible) monetary policy, bal-
ance money supply and demand and 
ensure macroeconomic stability. The 
increase in the money supply in 
2007–8 will be by 30–35 per cent 
less than in 2005–6. 
∗ There will be a gradual transition to 
a more flexible exchange rate in 
2009–15, with a widening margin of 
fluctuation, to make for more active 
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use of interest policy and a shift to a 
regime of inflation targeting. 
∗ The increase in consumer prices will 
be curbed by a market mechanism of 
price regulation, along with efficient 
anti-monopoly policies and stabilization 
of the increase rate in household in-
comes. The dynamics of this will be 
correlated with the growth of produc-
tivity. 
∗ Credit interest rates in national cur-
rency in 2007–8 will remain high 
(13.5–14.0 per cent) but will decrease 
as inflation slows in 2009–15. 
Fiscal policy in 2007–15 will depend 
on the following: 
∗ No overall increase in the fiscal pres-
sure on the real sector was expected 
in 2007. The state budget adopted 
would include amendments to tax leg-
islation (in particular, an increase in 
the rate of income tax from 13 to 15 
per cent, with possible reductions of 
the VAT rate from 20 to 18 per cent 
and of profit tax from 25 to 20 per 
cent). 
∗ If left unchanged for the forecast pe-
riod, the rules for VAT returns (es-
tablished in 2005) will create condi-
tions for further expansion of ac-
counts receivables and payables and 
reduce the circulating funds of eco-
nomic agents. 
The factors affecting welfare policy in 
2007–15 will be these: 
∗ The rate of natural decline in popula-
tion from 2007 onwards will be 
higher than in the previous period 
and the migration balance will remain 
positive, so that there will be no 
marked increase in Ukraine’s popula-
tion. 
∗ Rates of increase in disposable in-
comes and average monthly wages in 
2007–8 will be lower than the aver-
ages for 2002–6. Most of the increase 
in nominal and real monthly wages in 
2007–8 will correspond with real GDP 
growth, while being affected secondar-
ily by the review of the single tariff 
schedule for some groups of budget-
funded workers. 
∗ It is assumed that that the share of 
household disposable incomes in GDP 
in 2007–8 will be around 64 per 
cent, and no lower than the average 
for 2001–6.  
∗ The present increase in household 
consumption may cease, despite the 
increases in consumer credit and dis-
posable incomes, and the minimal wel-
fare standards. A modest increase in 
consumption (an annual average of 6–
7 per cent) is expected in the short 
and medium term, due to the ex-
pected introduction of moderate levels 
of minimum welfare social standards, 
and to much higher rates of growth 
in average monthly wages than in 
2001–6. The reason for the slowdown 
is the need to maintain proper com-
petitiveness of companies in the real 
sector.  
∗ The unemployment rate calculated by 
ILO methodology for 2007–8 will de-
cline, due to the increase in employ-
ment. So it will not be a major desta-
bilizing factor on the labour market, 
although there will be fluctuations in 
the unemployment rate for high and 
low-qualified workers alike. 
Factors affecting external economic ac-
tivity (2007–15) will be these: 
∗ A modest, gradual increase in export 
rates is expected (from 4.2 per cent 
in 2007 to 6.4 per cent in 2010), but 
this will be lower than the rate of 
real GDP increase. So there will be a 
progressive decline in the export pro-
portion of domestic production and a 
growing share supplying the domestic 
market, whose rate of development 
will increase. 
∗ An initial growth in the rate of im-
ports of goods and services will occur 
due to completion of the transition to 
European prices for natural gas im-
ported from Russia and to very high 
demand for imports in the period of 
renewal of production assets. The im-
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pact of the gas-price increase will be 
discussed further. The latter factor 
will keep imports growing faster than 
exports until 2009, after which there 
will be a marked slowdown in the 
import growth rate, which will begin 
to lag behind that of exports. That 
will bring an overall levelling off of 
the trade and current-account deficits. 
But with considerable demand for im-
ports remaining in the long period of 
capital renewal (up to 2015), 
Ukraine’s trade balance will remain 
negative. Acceleration of the rate of 
real GDP growth and a rise from 
2009 onwards in the nominal ex-
change rate of the hryvnia, the import 
share of GDP will tend to decrease 
(from 51.7 per cent in 2007 to 45.0 
per cent in 2015). 
∗ The considerable increase in gas 
prices will probably be coupled with a 
further increase in world oil prices, 
bringing a marked rise in production 
costs and a relative decline in the 
price competitiveness of Ukraine’s en-
ergy-intensive production, which is still 
central to the country’s export poten-
tials. This will encourage massive in-
troduction of energy-saving technolo-
gies, and some change in course for 
Ukrainian industry, towards faster de-
velopment of segments with low en-
ergy intensity. Both will require a con-
siderable increase in investment, in-
cluding a high level of foreign invest-
ment, as well as imports of investment 
goods. Such trends, coupled with slow 
export increases (due to partial loss 
of price competitiveness) will aggra-
vate the trade deficit and hence the 
current-account deficit. 
∗ There will be a change in the pattern 
of capital movements, from inward 
flow to two-way flow (at the expense 
of accelerated development of legal 
capital exports), and a gradual level-
ling of the overall balance of capital 
flows. The latter is necessary for 
Ukraine to gain external markets with 
a high value-added content, as well as 
high-tech markets that call for a con-
stant commercial presence. The 
changes will bring an increase in in-
come inflow and a corresponding de-
crease in the net balance of income 
flow. 
∗ There will be an increase in FDI in-
flow over the period of accelerated 
technological reconstruction. This is 
expected to peak in 2008–9, as the 
results of Ukraine’s accession to the 
WTO show themselves to the full (if 
this has occurred by the end of 
2007). However, there may be some 
devaluation of the national currency – 
due to an excessively high deficit on 
the current account under conditions 
of inward flow of other sources of 
hard currency inflow. Otherwise there 
might be a revaluation of the hryvnia 
with an adverse impact on the rates 
of economic growth). However, some 
decrease in annual FDI flows will oc-
cur from 2009 onwards, with the an-
nual figure stabilizing at about USD 
3800 million. Such a high level of FDI 
will cause a negative income balance 
over the whole period, though with a 
tendency for the level of this to de-
crease. The retention of quite a high 
negative balance of income movement 
under conditions of considerable ex-
pansion of legal capital exports will 
be caused in particular by the fact 
that business profitability in Ukraine is 
much higher than in the OECD coun-
tries. 
The basic scenario assumes that the 
rate of economic growth in 2007–9 will 
decrease somewhat to 6.5–6.8 per cent 
before increasing again to 7.2 per cent 
in 2010–15 (as period average), due to 
gradual revival of the investment compo-
nent in economic development. 
The main source of investment will 
remain companies’ own funds, but a re-
vival of investment demand can be ex-
pected from 2009 and satisfaction of 
this will be through domestic borrowing. 
At the same time, there is expected to 
be a further increase in budget invest-
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ment and a corresponding expansion of 
credit resources (Table 1). Under such 
conditions, the growth rates of gross in-
vestment are expected to be high (an 
annual average of 9.2–12.1 per cent). In 
the medium term, assuming that Ukraine 
accedes to the WTO in late 2007 and 
establishes more stable and transparent 
development conditions (through WTO 
membership), there will be an improve-
ment in the investment and business cli-
mate. 
High GDP growth will be supported 
by higher growth rates in domestic and 
external demand. However, such rates 
for Ukraine are historically somewhat 
low, as almost half the national GDP 
was lost during the transformational re-
cession. Slower price growth is predicted 
for the forecast period, along with a 
relatively high inflation rate caused by a 
notable increase in disposable household 
incomes (demand-push inflation) and in-
flationary expectations from producers, 
due to marked increases in energy prices 
(supply-push inflation). With the need for 
members of the new government to meet 
its election promises on welfare, the ex-
pectation is for moderate government 
activity on the market for external bor-
rowing, leading to concentration of 
credit activity in the private sector and 
reflected in lower average weighted in-
terest rates on credit (with a changed 
NBU approach to the formation of 
money supply). 
Domestic and foreign economic risks 
for the development of the Ukrainian 
economy relate to possibly unpredictable 
changes in the key parameters of global 
economic development and to the coun-
try’s possible inability to respond ade-
quately to the main foreign economic 
challenges, under conditions of aggra-
vated political instability. 
Here are some of the risks and re-
stricting factors that appeared in 2005–6 
and remain urgent in 2007–15. 
 
The real sector, 2008–15 
 
The increase in the welfare burden on 
the economy in 2007–8 coincided with 
considerable worsening of the economic 
growth rate in recent years. This pre-
sents some risks to the stability of 
Ukraine’s economic development. Last 
year’s GDP growth took place to a great 
extent at the expense of trade and 
transport services, which is a sign of 
accelerated consumption based on high 
rates of imports of consumer goods. 
That means a relative slowdown in the 
expansion of savings, as less of house-
holds’ money is reaching the banks, 
where it can become a source of invest-
ment funding. Currently there is a re-
turn to the ill-considered policy in public 
finance of not creating favourable condi-
tions for economic growth, but encour-
aging consumption. This leaves any gov-
ernment’s intentions of shifting towards 
an investment and innovation-based de-
velopment model and ensuring dynamic 
and sustainable growth purely declara-
tive. Over the coming years, if these ad-
verse tendencies are considered and the 
possibility of a third extraordinary par-
liamentary election and presidential elec-
tion in 2009, the probability of economic 
crisis considerably increases.  
Anti-dumping measures and restrictive 
quotas on the Russian market are being 
used against Ukrainian food producers. 
The aggravated trade war between 
Ukraine and Russia in 2006 led to a fall 
in the volume of Ukrainian food exports 
to Russia of more than a third, mainly 
due to the Russian embargo on meat 
and dairy products of Ukrainian origin. 
As Russia for many years has been a 
traditional outlet for Ukrainian producers 
and the corresponding losses are hard to 
offset, due to the specific nature of the 
meat and dairy trade, failure to take 
proper measures to improve relations 
with Russia could aggravate the negative 
tendencies in this field and lead to major 
losses of exports and output by the 
Ukrainian food industry. 
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Table 1 
Forecasts of main macro indicators of the Ukrainian economy up to 2015 
(basic scenario)* 
 
Years and periods of average annual change 
Actual data Forecast estimates Indicators 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
2008–
10 2011–15
Population and employment: 
Population (millions) 47.92 47.52 47.14 46.78 46.55 46.32 45.92 45.47 
Employment (15–70 years old, mil-
lions) 20.4 20.55 20.44 20.64 20.72 20.81 20.86 20.94 
Change in real macro indicators over previous year 
Capital assets, % 0.9 2.9 3.5 1.1 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.8 
Industrial output, % 7.0 15.8 12.5 3.1 6.2 10.1 9.6 10.5 
GDP, % 5.2 9.6 12.1 2.7 7.1 6.5 6.8 7.2 
Including: 
Final consumer expenses, % 4.0 10.0 9.7 15.7 11.2 7.1 6.4 7.0 
• by households 6.0 11.5 13.5 20.6 14.2 10.4 7.5 8.1 
• by general state sector -0.1 6.9 1.8 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.1 2.2 
Gross generation of fixed capital, 
% 5.3 22.5 20.5 3.9 18.7 16.1 9.5 10.1 
Exports of goods and services, % 11.1 10.3 21.3 -12.2 -3.1 4.5 6.4 7.0 
Imports of goods and services, % 7.4 16.4 15.5 6.4 6.3 8.4 6.8 6.4 
Prices and exchange rate 
CPI, average annual, % 0.8 5.2 9.1 13.5 9.1 12.5 8.5 4.5 
PPI, average annual, % 3.0 7.8 20.4 16.8 9.5 19.3 11.3 5.0 
Exchange rate, average annual, 
HRN > USD  5.33 5.33 5.32 5.12 5.05 5.05 5.2 5.3` 
Money and credit 
NBU refinancing rate, % annual 9.2 7.0 9.0 9.3 8.7 8.5 8.0 6.2 
Interest rate on credits, % annual 24.8 18.0 17.8 16.0 15.9 13.5 14.0 10.2 
Interest rate on deposits, % annual 7.8 7.5 9.3 9.4 9.2 9.2 7.8 6.5 
Monetary base, % to previous pe-
riod  33.6 30.1 34.2 54.2 18.1 32.0 19.0 15.2 
Money supply (М3), % to previous 
period  
41.8 46.5 32.3 54.3 35.2 34.2 28.7 25.1 
Consolidated budget, % to GDP 
Total revenues 27.4 28.2 26.5 30.4 32.0 29.9 28.3 26.5 
Total expenditures 26.7 28.4 29.4 32.2 32.7 30.5 29.8 27.5 
Balance 0.7 -0.2 -2.9 -1.8 -0.7 -2.6 -1.5 -1.0 
Social indicators 
Real average monthly wage, %  18.2 15.2 23.8 20.3 18.3 12.4 11.7 9.3 
Real unemployment rate (calculated 
according to ILO methodology), % 10.1 9.3 9.2 8.9 8.1 8.0 7.6 6.8 
Sources: Statystychnyi schorichnyk Ukrainy (Statistical yearbook of Ukraine) 1990. Kyiv: Derzhromstat 
Ukrainy, 1991; Statystychnyi schorichnyk Ukrainy 1995. Кyiv: Derzhromstat Ukrainy, 1996; Statystychnyi 
schorichnyk Ukrainy 2005. Кyiv: Derzhromstat Ukrainy, 2006; Natsional’ni rahunky Ukrainy za 2005 rik 
(National accounts of Ukraine for 2005). Kyiv.: Derzhromstat Ukrainy, 2004; Monitoryng makroeko-
nomichnyh ta haluzevyh pokaznykiv (Monitoring of macroeconomic and sectional indicators). Kyiv.: Minis-
try of Economics and European Integration, 2007. 4:84, 5–97; Biuleten’ NBU (NBU Bulletin) 2006. No 9, 
70; estimates by State Enterprise Institute for Economics and Forecasting, Ukrainian National Academy of 
Sciences. 
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There are possible risks associated 
with the unfavourable conditions on 
world markets for metals and chemicals. 
There has been insufficiently active policy 
to develop the domestic market, a de-
cline in foreign demand for Ukrainian 
metal and chemicals – though they will 
remain important export items. These are 
likely to worsen seriously the country’ 
economic prospects in the forecast pe-
riod. Proper consideration of these risks 
requires a revival of endogenous factors 
of economic development, related first of 
all to ensuring production restructuring 
in favour of the sectors producing do-
mestically oriented goods with a high 
value added.  
The political instability may also be-
come a considerable factor behind a de-
cline in investment activity by domestic 
and foreign investors. This would slow 
the transition to an investment and inno-
vation-based pattern of economic devel-
opment. 
 
The real sector, 2009–11 
 
The lack of progress in realizing large-
scale structural reforms designed to 
strengthen the investment and innovation-
based development component, coupled 
with delay in creating a basis for institu-
tional infrastructure oriented to giving 
access by medium-sized and small busi-
nesses to financial, innovative and staff-
development resources, may lead to some 
losses in potential economic growth. One 
marked threat to Ukraine’s economy is 
its inability to ensure institutional and 
regulatory bases for serious structural 
reforms in the economy, and its radical 
modernization with an essential increase 
in the international competitiveness of 
Ukrainian producers of high value added 
goods and high tech goods and services. 
Such a threat impinges on the economy’s 
inability to respond properly to global 
challenges. If the risks appear, the cur-
rent exogenous model of economic de-
velopment will remain with a further in-
crease in the raw-material orientation of 
production and dependence on foreign 
technology and capital.  
 
Forecast risks to development of the ser-
vices sector, 2008–15 
 
∗ Labour shortages due to the expected 
decrease in the population (to 41.8 
million in 2015, according to a UNDP 
forecast) will impinge, and so will the 
worsening of the demographic struc-
ture (the share of population under 
15 in 2015 is forecast to amount to 
be 13.5 per cent and of those over 65 
16.4 per cent, as opposed to world 
averages of 25.9 and 8.4 per cent re-
spectively. Added to that will be the 
effects of legal and illegal emigration. 
In the services sector, there is ex-
pected to be a further increase in the 
shortage of doctors and nurses, teach-
ers, researchers, and high and me-
dium-level engineers and technicians. 
(In some service sub-sectors, up to 40 
per cent of those employed are pen-
sioners or nearing pensionable age.  
∗ The slowdown of restructuring in the 
services sectors and in the country’s 
economy as a whole is due to sponta-
neous inflow of foreign capital to 
highly profitable sectors of financial 
services and realty, communication 
and trade transactions, as TNC 
branches usually follow the policy of 
parent companies, i.e. they do not 
“breed” their potential competitors 
(especially in high tech areas). They 
promote imports of goods and ser-
vices from their base countries 
(through consumer credit, leasing, 
etc.). They repatriate earned profits 
after completion of their privatization 
commitments, instead of investing them 
in innovations in other countries. (For 
information, the outflow of profits of 
foreign investors in the first half year 
of 2007 increased more than four 
times over the same period of previ-
ous year.)  
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∗ Financial risks associated with change 
in the position of the USD and other 
currencies in the world economy may 
lead to a loss of household savings 
and a fall in living standards.  
∗ Excess over the optimal amount of 
external debt (including government 
and corporate debt) may bring finan-
cial destabilization and a fall in living 
standards. 
 
Forecast risks related to budget policy 
(2008–15): 
 
∗ There may be unjustified decisions on 
additional privileges that increase wel-
fare or other expenditures without 
regard to budgetary constraints. There 
may be insufficient financing of gov-
ernment investment in innovation, in-
frastructural development, and qualita-
tive restructuring of the economy. 
∗ Public finances may be strained by 
gas subsidies to consumers, covering 
the difference between the consumer 
price and the import price out of the 
state budget. 
∗ If the state sector takes a higher 
share of net domestic credit (mainly 
to finance the deficit on the state 
budget), this could reduce the credit 
available to the real sector, which in 
turn could damage the liquidity of 
companies and organizations and re-
duce their investment and profitability. 
∗ Increased public debt to cover the 
budget deficit may jeopardize privati-
zation plans. 
∗ Insufficient budget revenues may in-
crease wage arrears. 
∗ Lower budget expenditures on non-
market services may reduce incomes 
in the budget-funded sector, which 
could have an adverse multiplier ef-
fect. 
Forecast risks related to monetary policy 
(2008–15): 
 
∗ An uncontrolled increase in govern-
ment borrowing on foreign markets 
(medium and long-term non-
guaranteed credits) would put addi-
tional pressure on the exchange mar-
ket and support a blind-alley devel-
opment model, with living standards 
supported by borrowed funds and a 
rising trade deficit. 
∗ Uncontrolled increases in corporate 
debt were especially prevalent in 
2004–6. 
∗ There may be macroeconomic aggra-
vation arising out of big volumes of 
consumer credit granted by banks. 
These may take the forms of an in-
creased foreign-trade deficit, (as the 
credit is mainly spent on imported 
durables), and a gap between the 
rates of increase in real household in-
come and banking credit, which 
would endanger the stability of the 
banks, as the growth rate in credit 
(extended, for instance, to households) 
would greatly exceed that of house-
hold income. 
∗ A worsening trade balance coupled 
with limited inflows of foreign ex-
change on the financial account in the 
country’s balance of payments would 
(due to detoriation of the investment 
climate) put strong pressure on the 
hryvnia for devaluation, which would 
bite into the hryvnia incomes and sav-
ings of households and businesses. On 
the other hand, a big excess of hard 
currency inflow along various chan-
nels should lead to revaluation of the 
hryvnia, leaving holders of hard cur-
rency as the losers. These scenarios 
may alternate, leading first to losses 
for those holding hard-currency funds, 
and then for those with hryvnia 
funds.  
∗ The government may prove unable to 
increase the action of market mecha-
nisms on price regulation. 
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∗ An uncontrolled increase in the vol-
ume of foreign borrowing (medium 
and long-term non-guaranteed credit) 
may bring increased demand for hard 
currency from the corporate sector, 
with limited chances to earn it, which 
would put extra pressure on domestic 
markets and transfer onto the domes-
tic exchange market the impact of ex-
ternal factors arising out of instability 
on international exchange and finan-
cial markets. 
∗ A surge in inflation may bring a 
higher discount rate. 
∗ There may be external risks related to 
price fluctuation and increased re-
source demand (for oil, gas etc.) 
∗ Considerable weakening of the dollar 
and increasing instability on interna-
tional exchange markets can be ex-
pected. 
 
Forecast risks related to social policy 
(2008–15): 
 
∗ There may be further unjustified wel-
fare decisions by the government, 
concerning the level of the minimum 
wage, subsistence level, and social 
privileges and benefits. 
∗ We expect considerable risks related 
to the balance of commodity and fi-
nancial flows on the consumer market 
in 2007–8, caused by low growth in 
real average monthly wages and dis-
posable incomes, due to unfulfilled 
public expectations on the agreement 
about minimum welfare standards. 
(Among the reasons for this is contin-
ual divergence of minimum wages and 
pensions from the subsistence level, 
and possible failure to implement the 
second and third stages of the single-
tariff schedule for workers in the 
public sphere.) 
∗ There will be an increase volume of 
imported goods on Ukraine’s con-
sumer market, due to the expansion 
of household credit, associated with 
goods that are not “materialized” in 
their wages. The absorption capacity 
of Ukraine’s consumer market will 
remain high, while a possible reduc-
tion in the rate of VAT would en-
courage importers (Ukraine’s VAT 
rate being lower than that of other 
countries) to saturate Ukraine’s mar-
ket with goods, especially from coun-
tries with higher VAT rates, as the 
importers’ own market becomes se-
curely protected. 
∗ There will be a risk of inflation, no-
tably an increase in the consumer 
price associable particularly with 
higher prices for private cars, land, 
housing and gold. This would increase 
further the already high degree of in-
come differentiation and segmentation 
of demand from high-income consum-
ers. 
∗ Persistence of the high demand-led 
prices for land and housing will allow 
the general public to accumulate 
wealth, but this will not produce suf-
ficiently active consumer demand, and 
therefore not provide an efficient 
boost to GDP. 
 
Forecast risks related to foreign trade 
(2008–15): 
 
Ukraine’s terms of trade will worsen 
further in 2007–9, due to a sharp de-
crease in world prices for metal and 
chemical products and further increases 
in world prices for oil. These changes 
will leave the main Ukrainian exports 
less competitive. 
∗ There will be additional requirements 
for Ukraine’s accession to the WTO. 
∗ There may be abrupt abandonment of 
the nominal anchor (stable exchange 
rate) under conditions of continual de-
terioration of the balance of foreign 
trade.  
The more serious external threats to 
Ukraine’s economy in 2007–15 include: 
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∗ There is a possibility of new global 
antagonism between East and West 
arising out of change in the geo-
economic balance of power and a 
strengthening of Asia’s role in the 
world economy. Such circumstances 
may greatly complicate Ukraine’s use 
of its geo-economic location. It would 
also bring a marked increase in de-
fence spending, with corresponding 
structural correction in the develop-
ment of the whole economy.  
∗ Mounting international political ten-
sions in the main oil-producing re-
gions (the Islamic factor in the Middle 
East, anti-Americanism in Venezuela, 
growing discontent with the United 
States and other Western countries in 
Africa) may bring further increases in 
world prices for energy materials.  
∗ There is a possibility that Ukraine may 
become caught between the Eastern 
and Western regional alignments un-
der conditions in which an orientation 
towards the EU would not bring bene-
fits in the near future (perhaps inde-
pendently of Ukraine’s actions, but 
due to internal EU processes). Under 
such conditions, Ukrainian producers 
would lose, not gain foreign markets 
which could result in forced diversion 
of Ukrainian trade flows towards 
third countries further afield. 
∗ The possibility of grave exacerbation 
of global environmental problems may 
cause the world community to adopt 
much stricter ecological standards. 
This could lead to a situation in 
which some Ukrainian sectors that are 
now effective hard-currency earners 
face serious restrictions and changes 
in the structure of the world econ-
omy. In that case, the trade and cur-
rent-account balances may deteriorate 
instead of improving, with devaluation 
of the national currency rather than 
revaluation, leading to Under such 
conditions, instead of leveling of the 
trade and current account balances, 
their growth may take place and, in-
stead of the tendency towards nominal 
revaluation of the national currency, 
devaluation tendencies will appear, 
which will inevitably lead to the in-
crease of GDP deflator and a corre-
sponding decline of real GDP growth 
rate.  
These risks apply to the 2007–15 pe-
riod, but the probability of them will be 
lower if structural reforms and updated 
technology can be implemented. 
It is calculated that if Ukraine’s slow 
long-term development, with low average 
GDP growth of 3, 0–3 or 5 per cent in 
2008–15, coupled with low investment, 
virtual exhaustion of traditional sources 
of economic growth, and possible eco-
nomic crises and external shocks under 
conditions of growing international com-
petition, the country’s global position will 
worsen markedly, preventing it from 
modernizing its economy or competing 
with other nations. This scenario falls 
beyond the forecasting range, but one 
thing is well understood and defined: if 
such risks obtain, Ukraine will be unable 
to achieve requisite rates of social and 
economic development or solve existing 
contradictions discussed earlier in the 
paper. The scenarios and forecast were 
developed at the Institute for Economics 
and Forecasting, Ukrainian National 
Academy of Sciences, under its Strategy 
of Economic and Social Development. 
Another serious obstacle to applying 
the strategy and to the realism of the 
forecast besides the provisos made so far 
may be the efforts of parliamentary par-
ties to meet their electoral commitments. 
The political commitments recorded on 
the eve of the election at the Institute of 
Economic Research and Political Consulta-
tions, under the direction of I. Bu-
rakovsky, were mainly of a welfare na-
ture. An attempt has been made, based 
on these, to carry out an evaluation of 
the changes that may occur in the dis-
tribution of the country’s GDP and con-
solidated budget, if the commitments are 
met, and to define the degree of the 
feasibility of such changes. In our calcu-
lations, we have allowed only for mini-
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mal additional expenses to meet party 
political commitments. We have not con-
sidered the more generous commitments, 
because as shown below, even the mini-
mal additional expenses are hardly feasi-
ble, if the government wishes to avoid a 
major economic shock that would lead to 
macroeconomic instability and eventually 
to an economic crisis.  
Table 2 shows the calculations made 
from the expected figures for GDP 
growth and implementation of the 2007 
budget, as an economic evaluation of 
these political decisions, carried out in 
2007 prices.  
It can be seen that even the minimum 
commitments (of the Party of Regions) 
would increase the tax burden by over 
7 percentage points and welfare expen-
ditures by over 8 percentage points. It 
should be pointed out that all the politi-
cal initiatives were taken on annual ba-
sis. Such a drag on the economy, even 
by the minimum commitments of the 
Party of Regions, would be 12.3 percent-
age points higher than in 2003, the last 
year before the continuing period of po-
litical instability. Since then, the welfare 
expenditures of the consolidated budget 
have been growing steadily. They made 
up 29.39 per cent in 2004, as opposed 
to 28.35 per cent in 2003, 32.1 per cent 
in 2005, 32.6 per cent in 2006, and a 
planned 33.34 per cent in 2007. Practi-
cally all the years of political instability 
have raised the burden. So it is not hard 
to foresee further increases in it in fu-
ture. If the coalition of 2007 begins to 
meet its electoral commitments, the in-
crease rate in welfare spending will be 
even higher, as it is impossible to find 
such resources by redistributing budget 
expenditures and equally impossible by 
making more efficient use of present 
budget funds. Such an assessment is 
based on the assumption that the power 
coalition includes the Party of Regions 
and adopts the minimum commitments of 
that party, while the maximum commit-
ments could leave the amounts in Table 
2 four times as high.  
If the government coalition, quite 
probably, does not include the Party of 
Regions, meeting the commitments of the 
other two most probable coalition mem-
bers (BYT and NU–NS) would raise the 
tax burden on the budget even more (by 
an additional 15 percentage points), 
while would greatly increase the level of 
business taxation, because it will be im-
possible to raise rapidly the tax yield 
from the employed, due to the forthcom-
ing presidential election – the incumbent 
would have no chance of re-election if 
such an increase were made; he is in 
practice the putative leader of any 
BYT/NU–NS coalition. Such a hike in 
business taxation would reverse the 
process by which actors in the shadow 
economy are being wooed into becoming 
legal, taxpaying businesses, which would 
in itself jeopardize the resources re-
quired. 
At the same time, all possible scenar-
ios of political developments predict a 
rise, not a fall, in the level of GDP re-
Table 2
Comparative assessment of drain on the budget and economy of meeting 
political commitments of parties elected to the Ukrainian legislature in 
2007, as % of consolidated budget and GDP expected in 2007 
 
 Expected 
2007 
Party of 
Regions BYT NU–NS CPU 
Lytvyn’s 
Bloc 
Total expenditures of consoli-
dated budget, % of GDP 33.34 40.7 55.4 47.3 76.0 60.7 
Welfare expenditures for con-
solidated budget purposes, % 
of GDP 
7.35 15.4 22.1 22.0 51.5 34.6 
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distribution through the budget, although 
not so rapid as the one shown in Table 
2. Realistically, the share of expenditures 
of the consolidated budget to GDP will 
increase from 33–4 per cent in 2007 to 
35–6 per cent, even in 2008. The ex-
penditures on economic development 
would not increase, as the times require, 
despite the fact that the BYT and NU–NS 
coalition will first cancel many of the 
existing tax incentives (as it is quite dif-
ficult to meet even some of the previous 
commitments without doing so.)  
The real increase in the burden on 
the economy and in the level of welfare 
protection will continue the tendency of 
the previous eight years, with GDP 
growth lagging behind the growth in 
household incomes. So one should expect 
further uncontrolled inflation, with con-
sequent development of the scenario of 
macroeconomic destabilization, followed 
by an increase in domestic prices and 
revaluation of the hryvnia. This will deal 
a simultaneous blow to exporters and to 
suppliers of the domestic market, as well 
as to the public. The need is for a mac-
roeconomic policy that will differ radi-
cally from one based on the prior politi-
cal commitments made by the leading 
parties. Otherwise, we must expect not 
only macroeconomic destabilization, but 
an economic slump, with output decline 
and lower living standards. So the wel-
fare commitments made by the election-
eering politicians poses a danger to the 
country. Another dangerous scenario 
with a political dimension is a sharp in-
crease in gas prices, which can be ex-
pected to begin as early as 2008, for 
there were already signs of it in late 
2007. Assessments of the possible conse-
quences have been made in Ukraine 
more than once, including one by the 
Institute for Economics and Forecasting, 
done by B. Kvasniuk and O. Bolkhoviti-
nova, which in our opinion gives the 
best considered estimate, as the factors 
are mutually related and based on offi-
cial (not departmental) statistics. The au-
thors of this forecast based their esti-
mates on the assumption that the gas 
price in the first half of 2006 was not 
the final one and would increase further 
to a level 1.5–2.0 times that of 2004, 
though that might still be insufficient in 
the medium term. Calculations have 
shown that such an increase will be 
highly detrimental to overall economic 
performance.  
The forecast in this case is that the 
chemical industry would find its operat-
ing costs rising by 24–32 per cent, with 
rises of 20–27 per cent for ferrous met-
allurgy, 14–19 per cent for building ma-
terials, 8–11 per cent for pulp and pa-
per, 6.9 per cent for wood processing 
industry, 2.0–2.7 per cent for food 
processing, and 1.1–1.4 per cent for light 
industry. Operating costs in the power 
sector will rise by 11–15 per cent. 
The overall results of the realistic 
forecast based on the impact of the gas-
price increases appear in Table 3. The 
assumptions are based on a sales growth 
rate of 5 per cent, but the impact of 
the inflation factor will worsen the fi-
nancial conditions for most sectors to 
such an extent that the prospect of an 
overall increase in selling prices becomes 
inevitable, as operating profitability falls 
below zero. If the sales rate is negative 
(a pessimistic realistic forecast), the fi-
nancial results of operational activities 
will be those shown in columns 4 and 5 
of the table. Then the inflation compo-
nent of economic growth becomes much 
stronger and there appears a high risk 
of slowdown in investment-based devel-
opment, particularly in the introduction 
of energy-saving technologies. 
The data in Table 4 show the ap-
proximate level of increase in selling 
prices expected in the economy if the 
producers, faced with rising prices for 
gas and some other elements in produc-
tion costs, try to hold their profitability 
at 2004 levels. We have deliberately ab-
stained from giving quantified parame-
ters for the forecast based on a crisis 
scenario – on the assumption that a 
considerable overall decline in output 
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Table 3 
The operating profitability of Ukrainian firms, assuming volume sales increases of 5 and 2 per 
cent, with symmetrical growth in non-gas operating costs and increases in average gas prices 
of 150 and 200 per cent over 2004 prices 
 
Profitability of operating activities of Ukrainian firms, % 
With a 5 per cent in-
crease in output sold, 
symmetrical non-gas cost 
growth, and a gas-price 
increase of: 
With a 2 per cent in-
crease in output sold, 
symmetrical non-gas cost 
growth, and a gas-price 
increase of: 
150% 200% 150% 200% 
 
Actual 
(2004) 
Realistic forecast Pessimistic realistic forecast
Economy total 4.0 -2.7 -3.4 -5.7 -6.5 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry 2.0 -3.5 -3.8 -6.6 -6.9 
Industry 6.5 -4.8 -7.2 -7.8 -10.3 
Mining 1.2 -5.3 -5.9 -8.4 -9.0 
Manufacturing 7.8 -3.3 -5.7 -6.3 -8.8 
Food and processing  1.2 -5.1 -5.7 -8.2 -8.8 
Food industry 2.8 -3.6 -4.2 -6.6 -7.3 
Light industry -1.8 -7.7 -8.0 -10.8 -11.2 
Lumber and wood working  2.8 -4.5 -5.5 -7.6 -8.6 
Pulp and paper; printing 6.4 -5.1 -7.6 -8.2 -10.7 
Chemicals and petrochemicals  13.0 -5.1 -10.1 -8.2 -13.4 
Chemicals 15.3 -6.8 -13.3 -9.9 -16.6 
Other mineral items (building materials 
etc.) 
 
5.6 
 
-10.9 
 
-15.1 
 
-14.1 
 
-18.5 
Metallurgy and metal working 13.0 -4.4 -9.2 -7.5 -12.4 
Metallurgy 12.9 -5.9 -11.1 -9.0 -14.4 
Ferrous metallurgy 14.3 -5.1 -10.6 -8.2 -13.9 
non-ferrous metallurgy 6.1 -5.8 -8.5 -8.9 -11.7 
Machine building 4.6 -2.3 -3.1 -5.3 -6.2 
Generation and distribution of electric-
ity, gas and water 
 
2.9 
 
-11.4 
 
-14.8 
 
-14.6 
 
-18.2 
Generation and distribution of electricity 6.5 -5.7 -8.5 -8.8 -11.6 
Production and distribution of gas-type 
fuels 
-5.7 -18.0 -20.6 -21.5 -24.2 
Production and distribution of heating -16.5 -53.5 -64.7 -58.0 -69.6 
Construction 2.2 -2.5 -2.6 -5.5 -5.6 
Trade 1.4 -3.3 -3.3 -6.3 -6.4 
Hotels and restaurants -7.9 -13.2 -13.2 -16.5 -16.6 
Transports 14.4 8.0 7.1 5.3 4.4 
Surface transport 12.6 2.2 0 -0.6 -2.9 
Source: Calculations based on data of 4–MTP (annual) statistical form “Report of residuals and use of 
energy materials and oil processing products”. 
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Table 4 
Expected growth in selling prices necessary to maintain profitability at 2004 levels, with in-
creases in average gas prices of 150 and 200 per cent over 2004 
 
Expected growth of selling prices required to 
maintain profitability at the 2004 level, with 
an average gas-price increase of: 
 Operating profitability 
in 2004, % 
150 % 200 % 
Economy total 4.0 111.8 112.6 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry 2.0 110.7 111.1 
Industry 6.5 116.5 119.1 
Mining 1.2 111.7 112.4 
Manufacturing 7.8 116.3 118.8 
Food processing  1.2 111.6 112.2 
Food industry 2.8 111.5 112.2 
Light industry -1.8 111.2 111.6 
Timber and wood processing 2.8 112.5 113.6 
Pulp and paper; printing 6.4 116.7 119.3 
Chemicals and petrochemicals 13.0 123.4 128.7 
Chemicals 15.3 127.5 134.3 
Other mineral items (building 
materials etc.) 
 
5.6 
 
122.0 
 
126.5 
Metallurgy and metal working 13.0 122.7 127.7 
Metallurgy 12.9 124.1 129.6 
Ferrous metallurgy 14.3 124.7 130.5 
Non-ferrous metallurgy 6.1 117.2 120.0 
Machine building 4.6 112.0 112.8 
Production and distribution of  
Electricity, gas and water 
 
2.9 
 
119.8 
 
123.4 
Generation and distribution of 
electricity  
6.5 117.5 120.4 
Production and distribution of 
gas-type fuels 
 
-5.7 
 
118.2 
 
121.0 
Production and distribution of 
heat 
-16.5 144.7 156.5 
Construction 2.2 109.9 109.9 
Trade 1.4 109.9 109.9 
Hotels and restaurants -7.9 110.9 111.0 
Transports 14.4 111.1 112.0 
Surface transport 12.6 115.2 117.6 
Source: Calculated basing on data of 4-MTP (annual) statistical form “Report of residuals and use of 
energy materials and oil processing products” 
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occurs. However, such a scenario is 
probable too. An economy such as 
Ukraine’s, which has exhausted the scope 
for renewal growth, can develop further 
only within an investment-based pattern 
and after solving the problem of energy 
resources, where the essential ingredient 
is energy saving. Considering the current 
obsolescence in Ukraine (for example, 
wear and tear on fixed capital in metal-
lurgy has reached 60–70 per cent), the 
volume of investment necessary to im-
plement energy saving programmes 
would be very big. According to the 
most likely estimates, the investment re-
quired to introduce energy-saving tech-
nologies in metallurgy alone would be 
USD 10–30 billion.1 
Replacement of equipment and intro-
duction of energy-saving technologies 
needs to occur not only in metallurgy, 
but in chemicals and in pulp and paper, 
as well as in production of building ma-
terials, machine engineering, and all 
other spheres tied to these. In the opin-
ion of Lars Handriks (Institute for Eco-
nomic Research – DIW), an expert on 
Eastern Europe and member of German 
Consultative group in Ukraine, the in-
vestment requirement for energy-saving 
purposes, with due regard to inter-
sectoral ties, amounts to USD 110 bil-
lion.2  
The companies whose business position 
allows them to raise their prices will do 
so to boost their profitability and gener-
ate investment resources. For example, a 
gas price of USD 160–80 per cent is 
likely to bring an increase of 25–30 per 
cent in the prices for Ukrainian cement. 
This will follow earlier, 2006 cement-
price increases of 7–8 per cent and an 
imminent second increase of 14–15 per 
cent. According to expert calculations, 
                                                   
1 нергосбережения и новые технологии. 
Совместное приложение Дело, ИнвестГазета, 
изд-во «Экономика». - №1. - март 2006. –  .46, 
56; http://www.from-ua.com/eco. 
2 http://Handelsblatt, 24.03.2006. 
the price for M400 cement will rise by 
40 per cent, etc. 
The cost of Ukrainian paper will 
probably grow by 7–8 per cent, so that 
it loses its price advantage over imports. 
(The market share of domestically pro-
duced paper is expected to fall from 35 
to 30 per cent.) If the gas price ap-
proaches USD 160 per 1000 cubic me-
tres, Ukrainian paper will rise in price 
by another 20–30 per cent. Similar fig-
ures can be cited for many other sec-
tors. This means Ukraine faces a consid-
erable increase in its trade deficit. All 
consumer categories obviously face a 
further gas-price increase in the very 
near future.3 It can be hoped that the 
eventual transfer of the price increase to 
consumers will be gradual, although that 
too will place a burden on the budget 
with obvious consequences. 
Based on these considerations, it can 
be foreseen that the only source of in-
vestment source for the economy in the 
short, and possibly the medium run will 
be credits and foreign technology. 
Meanwhile a potential crisis is building 
up in the economy, which will reduce 
the country’s ability to raise credit and 
its attractiveness to investors. This makes 
it urgent to address the question of the 
quality of foreign borrowing and invest-
ment. Ukraine will no longer be in a 
position to choose among suitors; it will 
need to be chosen. Foreign investors will 
come to the most profitable sectors, such 
as banking, trade, telecommunications, 
metallurgy, and possibly the fuel sector, 
and probably also to gas transportation 
and other strategic facilities. There are 
risks involved in permitting excessive de-
                                                   
3 Russia’ Gazprom officially advised Ukraine’s 
Naftogaz that from July 1, 2006, the selling price 
would be USD 130 per 1000 cubic metres. This 
is not yet the final price, however. O. Medvedev, 
the deputy director of Gazprom, said in an in-
terview, “On July 1, 2006, the question of price 
revision will be discussed… As regards the 
market price, we have mentioned it long ago. It 
is USD 230 per 1000 cubic meters. And we even 
put that parameter in the price formula fixed in 
our agreements…” Kontrakty 16:727, April 17, 
2006. 
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pendence on foreign credit, which can 
undermine the financial system, the more 
so as the current one is not investment 
directed, but used for consumer credit 
that is provoking further price inflation.  
Short-term increases in the price of 
imported natural gas will place a con-
siderable extra burden on the Ukrainian 
economy, above all its fuel-intensive sec-
tors, such as metallurgy, chemicals, 
building materials, pulp and paper, and 
food, which, through inter-sectoral ties, 
will lead to an overall price increase in 
the economy. Under such conditions, 
domestic investment potential will be con-
siderably reduced and real investment in 
the economy funded by companies them-
selves may fall by 20–40 per cent from 
the previous year. Inflation will also 
bring a decline in household bank depos-
its, with a consequent cost increase and 
reduction of long-term credit available 
for the real sector. 
Ukrainian society is undergoing a very 
high degree of politicization. Political 
leaders with wide influence on the public 
have a big chance to begin explaining 
the objective economic difficulties and 
justifying an anti-crisis policy that will 
undoubtedly involve a temporary freeze 
on living standards. At the same time, 
leaders could draw up a new investment 
strategy that considers all the difficulties 
of the economic situation and identifies 
in detail the potential sources of invest-
ment. 
 
* * * * * 
